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A Longitudinal Study of the Effects
of Graduate Medical Education on
Hospital Operating Costs
Kathleen Dalton, Edward C. Norton, and Kerry Kilpatrick
Objective. To examine the effect of graduate medical education sponsorship on
hospital operating costs over a seven-year period, to test for a longitudinal association
between teaching intensity and cost, and to determine whether the indirect medical
education (IME) payment adjustments made under Medicare's Prospective Payment
System are appropriate.
Data Sources. Medicare cost and payment data from the Hospital Cost Report
Information System and other related HCFA files, from FFY 1989 through 1995. The
study population consists of all short-stay hospitals (-5,000) participating in Medicare
and receiving case payments by diagnosis-related groups.
Study Design. The original cost functions used to develop indirect medical educa-
tion payment adjustments under PPS are re-estimated with panel data. Specification
changes are included based on findings from critiques of the original hospital cost
model. Additional variations on the model are explored to test for differences by
hospital status, to control for the effect of additional disproportionate share and
outlier payments, and to isolate the effects of improved case-mix measurement on
model results.
Principal Findings. Fixed effects regression produces no evidence of a significant
within-hospital association between increased sponsorship of medical residents and
increased cost per case. In models designed to capture a cross-sectional association,
operating costs are positively related to teaching activity, but the association shows a
decline in strength over time. In all years, the strength ofthe association is significantly
greater among hospitals eligible for disproportionate share adjustments and among
major teaching hospitals. Controlling for secular trends of increased teaching intensity
results in a pattern of declining cross-sectional teaching coefficients that supports a
theory that observed teaching effects are the result of unmeasured case severity.
Conclusions. A significant but declining cost differential is observed between teaching
and nonteaching hospitals. The association appears to be related to hospital and patient
characteristics that cannot be controlled using currently available case-mix and wage
indices. Longitudinal models do not provide evidence to support a payment adjust-
ment formula that allows individual hospitals to recompute their IME adjustment
rates as their teaching ratios rise or fall from year to year. Cross-sectional findings
suggest that re-estimations of the teaching effect may be appropriate when significant
improvements occur in Medicare case-mix measurement.
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Medicare's incremental payments to teaching hospitals are highly controver-
sial. An estimated $4.6 billion was paid in 1997 as indirect medical education
(IME) adjustments added on to payments for acute care discharges (Med-
PAC 1998). Hospitals that receive IME payments have substantially higher
Medicare payment-to-cost margins than those that do not (ProPAC 1995).
IME adjustments to the per-case payment rates under the Prospective
Payment System (PPS) were originally derived from observed cost differen-
tials in teaching hospital settings (Pettengill and Vertrees 1982). Evidence that
the IME formulas overcompensate for cost differentials has been documented
repeatedly (ProPAC 1987, 1991, 1992; CBO 1995), but the adjustments have
been successfully justified to Congress on the grounds that overall operating
margins of teaching facilities are worse than those of their nonteaching coun-
terparts, and serious financial dislocation would result if IME payments were
reduced (COGME 1990;AAMC 1997b; ProPAC 1997). Thus the adjustment
has undergone a conceptual transformation since its introduction in 1984,
from a tool for product differentiation within an administered price system to
an explicit Medicare subsidy used by teaching institutions to underwrite other
revenue shortfalls as they carry out their social and educational missions.
Much of the current policy debate with respect to Medicare payments
to teaching hospitals focuses on the public policy implications of this notion
of subsidy (Pew Health Professions Commission 1995; Cohen 1998; Ross
1999). IME adjustments are designed, however, to address a combination of
valid cost differentials as well as public policy objectives. An examination of
the econometric evidence for incremental teaching payments is a necessary
component of the re-evaluation of Medicare support for medical education.
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Effects ofMedical Education on Hospital Costs
BACKGROUND
Under Medicare's PPS for short-stay hospitals, facilities that sponsor or have
formal affiliations with graduate medical education programs receive incre-
mental payments that vary according to the ratio of on-site trainees to hospital
beds and that are proportional to the base payment per diagnosis-related
group (DRG) (Social Security Act § 1886). Slightly over one-fifth of all short-
stay hospitals qualify for these IME payments. The mean IME adjustment
in 1995 was a 12.6 percent increment to the hospital's payment per DRG,
but the distribution is highly skewed. Approximately 10 percent of qualifying
hospitals received adjustments of over 36 percent, while 50 percent received
adjustments below 7 percent. IME payments comprised 4.8 percent of Medi-
care PartA payments to short-stay hospitals in 1989 and 6.3 percent in 1995.'
The term "indirect medical education cost" refers to observed differ-
ences in Medicare operating costs that correlate with measures of the intensity
of a hospital's participation in graduate medical education. It does not refer
to any of the direct costs attributable to resident stipends, faculty supervision,
or other overhead related to educational activities reimbursed by Medicare
under a separate payment scheme as "direct medical education costs." The
indirect cost differentials were empirically derived by Health Care Financing
Administration (HCFA) analysts from the parameter estimates on a teaching
intensity variable in regression models of operating costs per Medicare dis-
charge that controlled for case mix, urban location, hospital size, and local
wage variation (Pettengill and Vertrees 1982). In pre-PPS hospital payment
regulations, HCFA had incorporated similar adjustnents to limitations im-
posed on routine per-diem costs and, later, on target costs per discharge that
were part of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA) 1982
payment regulations (CCH 1999).
In analyses conducted for the PPS adjustments, costs from 1981 data
were originally found to be 5.79 percent higher for each increase of 0.10 in
the teaching variable, which was measured as 1 plus the ratio of interns and
residents to staffed beds (IRB). Medicare's IME adjustment is structured to
reflect these cost differentials as a similarly increasing function ofa resident-to-
bed ratio computed by the hospitals each year on their cost reports. While the
PPS legislation was under consideration, Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
simulations compared projected payments under PPS to reimbursement
under the existing cost-based system and generated some political concern by
predicting that 71 percent of all teaching hospitals and 70 percent of hospitals
with over 300 beds would experience reductions in payment (Lave 1985).
1269
1270 HSR: Health Services Research 35:6 (February 2001)
Congress responded by allowing a multiplier of 2.0 to be applied when the
model's teaching coefficient was incorporated into a formula for teaching
hospital payments, doubling the observed effect and creating a total IME
adjustment rate of 11.59 percent.
In 1985, the 1981 data were re-analyzed by the CBO to incorporate
several technical changes to the cost model, and the coefficient was estimated
at 0.405 (ProPAC 1989). COBRA 1985 (PL 99-272) altered the formula for the
IME adjustment, both to apply the new coefficient and to allow the payment
formula to reflect the diminishing marginal effect of teaching intensity that
is implied by the model's functional form. A further adjustment in OBRA
1987 (PL 100-203) reduced the policy-derived multiplier from 2.0 to 1.89,
and this formula remained in effect from 1988 to 1997. The Balanced Budget
Act of 1997 (PL 105-33) mandated a phased-in reduction of the multiplier
down to 1.35 by 2001. The basic form of the payment adjustment, however,
has not been altered since the 1985 legislation. Results from the CBO's cross-
sectional study of 1981 hospital operating costs still constitute the basis for
IME adjustment for the operating component of the DRG payment. Since
1992, IME adjustments have also applied to the DRG payments for capital
costs. The capital IME formula is derived from a slightly different model
where teaching intensity is measured by the ratio ofresidents to occupied beds
(Phillips 1992). This article addresses only the operating IME adjustment, but
our findings may apply equally to the adjustment made to the capital portion
of the DRG payment.
The model estimating hospital operating costs is a log-linear transforma-
tion of a Cobb-Douglas production function in the form of Y = aX s, where
the dependent variable is the natural log of the average Medicare operating
cost per case, and incremental units ofX each have diminishing marginal
effects on Y. Log transformation permits the equation to be estimated using
linear modeling techniques. As described by Pettengill and Vertrees (1982),
HCFAXs original estimating equation regressed the transformed cost variable
on the natural log of (1 + IRB)-adding the constant of 1.0 to the resident-
to-bed ratio allowed the logged teaching variable to equal 0 in the case of
nonteaching hospitals. The remaining independent variables were the logs of
each hospital's case-mix index, area wage index, and bed capacity, and a set
of indicator variables designating urban and large urban location. When the
CBO re-estimated the equation it added a variable to proxy for dispropor-
tionate share (charity) obligations, eliminated the bed capacity variable, and
constrained the coefficients on the case-mix and wage index variables to equal
1.00 and 0.75, respectively (ProPAC 1989; Sheingold 1990). The general
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formula for the IME adjustment rate is represented as M x [(1 + IRB)p - 1],
where [B is the estimated teaching coefficient and M represents the policy-
derived multiplier described above.2 Figure 1 graphically compares the com-
puted cost adjustments from the different IME formulas in effect since PPS
inception for resident-to-bed ratios ranging from 0 to 1.3.
Teaching cost differentials were attributed initially to inefficiencies in-
herent to training residents (Pettengill and Vertrees 1982). Other explanations
interpreted the teaching variable as a proxy measure for unobserved patient
and hospital characteristics, including greater illness severity and treatment
intensity, which were not adequately captured by the case-mix index, and
to poor control for wage variation and other location-related factors (Lave
1985). Published critiques of the HCFA cost model have concentrated on
identifying bias from omitted variables (Anderson and Lave 1986; Welch
1987; Thorpe 1988) and incorrect functional form (Thorpe 1988; Rogowski
and Newhouse 1992). Both the Thorpe and the Rogowski and Newhouse
studies found evidence that teaching effects were not log-linear but had some
Figure 1: History of the Indirect Medical Education Payment
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threshold value above which the teaching coefficient was significantly greater.
Rogowski and Newhouse re-estimated the HCFA cost function with data from
1984, using alternative log transformations. They concluded that what had
been identified as omitted variables bias by earlier research was more likely
the result of inappropriate functional form that could be corrected by re-
formulating the teaching variable as the log of (.0001+ IRB) and relaxing the
assumption ofconstant elasticity with respect to teaching. They also addressed
technical shortcomings of -the earlier models by adding weights (appropriate
to analysis on grouped data) and introducing smearing estimates (appropriate
for retransformation of a log model under certain types of heteroscedasticity).
What may be most notable about the literature as a whole is that,
regardless of the specification changes, indirect teaching costs continued to
be identified as significant and positive for some or all teaching facilities. The
distribution of the IME cost differentials (and therefore also the payment
adjustments) across hospitals is clearly influenced by the model's choice of
control variables and functional form. In total, however, the analyses do not
contradict HCFA's original premise of a positive cross-sectional association
between teaching intensity and cost that cannot be explained by available
measures of patient mix or regional variation in input prices.
Since the implementation of PPS, the margin between Medicare inpa-
tient payments and hospital costs has been consistently higher amongteaching
than nonteaching hospitals, and highest among major teaching hospitals.
Over the seven years covered by our study, the margins have improved for
all short-stay facilities, but the gaps by teaching status have widened (see
Note 1). One reason for this lies with the disproportionate share payments,
which are correlated with teaching activity and which have also grown over
this period. Another explanation, which we investigate in this study, may be
in the mechanics of the IME payment formula as written into legislation. The
coefficient of0.405 represents an estimate ofthe association between teaching
and cost observed across hospitals in a single year. While the coefficient in
the formula is mandated and has not changed since COBRA 1985, until the
Balanced Budget Act of 1997 individual hospital IME adjustment rates were
still recomputed each year using annually updated resident-to-bed ratios. In a
given year, ifHospitalA and Hospital B were located in similar labor markets,
but Hospital A's ratio was 0.10 and Hospital B's was 0.20, Hospital B's pay-
ment per DRG exceeded that of Hospital A by approximately (1.89 x 4.05),
or 7.7 percentage points. Similarly, if Hospital A increased its ratio from 0.10
in one year to 0.20 in the next, its payment rate in the subsequent year was
raised by 7.7 percentage points. Thus the IME formula implemented the
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payment differentials as though the research had demonstrated that the effect
of teaching intensity on cost was applicable within hospitals over time, as well
as across hospitals.
If the longitudinal association is not present, this annual recomputation
of the IME adjustment will increasingly overpay facilities that expand their
teaching commitments, reduce their bed complements, or both. Figure 2
places this issue in a Medicare budget perspective. The proportion of IME
payments attributable to increases in teaching intensity-as distinct from
increases in price, Medicare caseload, case mix, or the number of teaching
hospitals-can be derived by analyzing real historical IME payment amounts
made to the cohort of teaching hospitals that received IME adjustments from
PPS years 6 through 12 (1989 through 1995). In Figure 2, the components
of real IME payments are graphed separately. Because the payments are
deflated, the absolute numbers on the y-axis are less important than the pro-
portion of the top layer (amounts attributable to increased teaching intensity)
relative to the total area under the graph. Over the study period, this segment
represents roughly 8 percent of total real-dollar payments to this cohort. By
PPS year 12, it represented nearly 14 percent.
The relative improvement of teaching hospital payment margins is
also at least partially attributable to stronger cost reductions among teaching
Figure 2: Sources of Real Increases in IME Education Adjustments
Paid from PPS Years 6-12
Real IME AioLunIts P'aid to Cohort of l'I'S Year 6i Teaching Hospitals:
S3.15
incremen t du7we to increase
$3.( - increment di/e to hiuber in resident-bed ratio
$1.0 base payments made in PPS Year 6
PPS 6) PPS 7 P1'-S 8 1'11'S 9 III'S It) ITS 11I P1I'S 12
(expressed in 1987 dollars, deflated by PPS Piice Index)
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institutions. From 1989 to 1995, real case-mix-adjusted operating costs per
case dropped by 11.5 percent among major teaching hospitals and 10.8
percent among minor teaching hospitals, compared to a decline of only 5.8
percent among nonteaching hospitals (see Note 1). During this same period,
the resident-to-bed ratios used to compute IME payments on the submitted
cost reports increased by an average of 21 percent. The downward trends
in average cost per discharge, occurring simultaneously with increases in the
IRB ratios, suggest that increases in teaching intensity over time may not be
associated with increased cost per discharge, or at least may not have as strong
an association as has been observed in cross-sectional studies. Because there
is also a contemporaneous trend of reduced length of stay resulting in lower
costs per discharge across all facilities, conclusions regarding the independent
role of teaching activities are difficult to draw from this type of descriptive
study across groups of hospitals.
The following analysis of pooled cross-sectional data at the individual
hospital level was conducted in order to gain a better understanding of the
association between teaching intensity and cost per case over time. To the
extent that teaching intensity serves as a proxy measure for other unobserved,
but primarily fixed, hospital characteristics associated with increased costs,
the longitudinal association within hospitals was expected to be small or
non-existent. To the extent that the Medicare case-mix index has improved
since 1981 and become a more sensitive measure of severity, the cross-
sectional effects of teaching intensity were expected to decrease over time
because less unmeasured patient acuity should be absorbed by the teaching
coefficient. However, a small or non-existent within-hospital effect would also
be consistent with a serially decreasing cross-sectional effect even without the
influence of improved case-mix measurement, in light of the secular trend of
increased resident-to-bed ratios throughout this study period.
DATA
Hospital-level files from the Hospital Cost Report Information System
(HCRIS) minimum data sets were used for PPS years 6 through 12, corre-
sponding to federal fiscal years ending September 1989 through September
1995. Cost data were merged with HCFA Case-Mix Index Files, the Provider
Specific Files, the Historical Wage Index File, and the PPS Input Price Index.
An annual case-mix index value was constructed for each provider based on
a weighted average of the published values for each of two periods spanning
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the provider's fiscal year. Wage index values were applied with a three-year
lag (e.g., the index value for PPS year 9 was used as a control variable for
observations during PPS year 6) in order to improve the match between
the analysis year and the year when the wage data were actually collected.
Wage index values were assigned based on the metropolitan statistical area
(MSA) or state rural area in which the facility was located. The resident-
to-bed ratio used in the model was algebraically derived from the ratio of
IME payments to total DRG payments, as reported by the hospitals in their
payment settlement data. (Descriptions of this derivation and of alternative
sources for the teaching variable are available from the author on request.)
The combined HCRIS files contained data on 5,720 unique providers
paid under the PPS-DRG system. Observations on hospitals located in Puerto
Rico (0.9 percent) and those with fewer than 50 Medicare discharges in a
given year (2.6 percent) were excluded from the study. Another 1.2 percent
were excluded due to out-of-range cost or payment data or missing records
from other merged HCFA files. The final study sample consisted of 5,413
unique providers, contributing a total of 35,085 observations over seven
years. Descriptive statistics for the full study sample and the subset ofteaching
hospitals are presented in Table 1.
METHODS
The first analysis is designed to test for the presence of a within-hospital,
or longitudinal, association. A fixed effects technique is used that explicitly
controls for cross-sectional variation by estimating separate intercepts for
each hospital. Since the model controls for all fixed hospital characteristics,
it produces slope parameter estimates derived only from the variation of the
independent variables within each hospital over time. The teaching coefficient
generated from this estimation thus has no possible interpretation as a basis for
adjusting payments across hospitals. The coefficient is relevant, however, to
the interpretation ofHCFA's original single-year models and may be useful in
guiding the translation of cross-sectional results into a formula for an equitable
payment adjustment applicable over multiple years.
The fixed effects model was restricted to the subgroup of 1,308 hospitals
that received IME payments during the study period. The dependent variable
is the natural log of real operating cost per Medicare case, defined as it
was in previous HCFA models by excluding costs related to capital, direct
medical education, and organ acquisition. Costs were deflated using the
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Table 1: Descriptive Data from 7-Year Study Sample, PPS Years
6-12 (Total observations = 35,085)
% Change
All over Study
Years PPS 6 PPS 9 PPS 12 Period
Full sampk
No. unique hospitals 5,413 5,125 5,082 4,818 -6.90/o
Average no. staffed beds 152 155 153 147 -5.2%
Average operating cost/discharge:
Actual $4,617 $4,059 $4,804 $4,763 +17.3%
Adjusted (net DSH and outlier) $4,289 $3,829 $4,474 $4,322 +12.9%
Average case-mix index 1.194 1.222 1.254 +5.00/o
% DSH providers 34.1% 25.7% 36.4% 40.2% +56.4%
% teaching hospitals 21.7% 20.8% 21.5% 23.0% +10.6%
Teaching hospital subsample only
No. unique hospitals 1,307 1,040 1,084 1,097 +5.5%
Average no. staffed beds 311 320 316 292 -8.7%
Average resident-to-bed ratio 0.166 0.151 0.160 0.183 +21.2%
Average operating cost/discharge:
Current dollars $6,460 $5,701 $6,711 $6,364 +11.6%
Constant (1987) dollars $5,142 $5,047 $5,315 $4,797 -5.00/o
Average case-mix index 1.361 1.435 1.476 +8.4%
% DSH providers 59.1% 46.4% 62.5% 65.3% +40.7%
% major teaching
(COTH members) 25.5% 25.5% 25.6% 24.4% -4.3%
quarterly moving average of HCFA's PPS Input Price Index that was closest
to the provider's fiscal year. The independent variable of interest is teaching
intensity, defined as ln(1 +IRB).3 PPS year indicators were included to control
for secular trends not related to inflation. Disproportionate share (DSH)
status is included as a policy indicator variable coded as 1 if the hospital
received any DSH payments. Wage index was not included in the model,
as it is recomputed each year to center on 1.00 and has no interpretation as
a time-based cost predictor. Urban status was also excluded because it is a
fixed characteristic that becomes exactly collinear with the hospital indicator
variable. Interaction terms were computed to test whether the effect of the
teaching variable is different among facilities eligible for disproportionate
share adjustments or among major teaching facilities (identified as members
of the Council of Teaching Hospitals, or COTH). Excluding the effects of
discharge-based weights, the fixed effects estimating equation is
Effects ofMedical Education on Hospital Costs
In (oper cost/case)j, = Saj + f1 ln(1 + IRB)jt + 02 In (case-mix index)jt
+ 03 ln(#beds)jt + P4 DSHjt + P6 (major status)jt
+f 5 (DSH x IRB)jt + P7 (major x IRB)1t
+* 6tyeart + £jt,
where Eaj represents the fixed hospital coefficients estimated by the model,
yeart is the vector of time trend indicators, and DSH x IRB and major x
IRB are the two interaction terms between teaching and hospital status.
Analytic weights are used to control for heteroscedasticity inherent in analysis
of group means, constructed from the square root of the number of Medicare
discharges from each observation.
The second set of analyses returns to a model that is similar to those
employed by the earlier single-year investigations, but that examines the
independent effect oftime on the cross-sectional association between teaching
intensity and cost. Four separate specifications were investigated. To obtain
baseline comparisons, we began with a log-log model similar to that used by
HCFA, with the addition ofthe DSH policy variable and time-trend indicators
for PPS years 7 through 12, plus their respective interaction terms on the
teaching variable. No constraints were imposed on the coefficients of any
control variables. (For this reason, the teaching coefficients we derive are not
directly comparable to the CBO's coefficient, although this should not affect
findings with respect to time trends.) Since the teaching effects are computed
separately for each year, the dependent variable was not adjusted for inflation.
Categorical variables for small, medium, and large urban status were tested
but produced nearly identical coefficients; consequently, urban status was
entered into the model as a single indicator variable defined by the hospital's
location in an MSA as of its last year in the study. Weighted least squares
regression estimated the following equation:
ln (oper cost/case)I, = a + PI ln(l + IRB)jt + ,B2 ln(case-mix index)jt
+13 ln(wage index)j, + P4 ln(#beds)jt
+ P5 DSHstatusjt + P6 urban status1 + 16,year,
+ 26,(year x IRB)jt + v;,
where 6, and 6* represent main and interacted effects of each of the time
trend variables. Due to the structure of the panel data, the error term vj, is
known to contain a component that is correlated within individual hospitals.
This problem is addressed using Huber-White standard errors with clustering
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by hospital. The hypothesis of declining teaching effects over time is tested
by obtaining coefficients on the 6* that are smaller in each successive year
and that test significantly differently from each other.
This model was expanded to include another dichotomous variable
indicating major teaching status, defined as membership in COTH. Two
interaction terms were added to test for differences in the strength of the
teaching effect by DSH eligibility and by major teaching status. Because
separate PPS payment adjustments are available for exceptionally high-cost
cases (outliers) and for DSH providers, a strong argument can be made to
account for such payments when estimating indirect medical education costs,
before using model coefficients to construct an IME adjustment formula.
In a third variation on the model, therefore, the dependent variable was
recalculated based on costs from which DSH and outlier payments had
been deducted. Finally, a fourth specification was developed that retained
the DSH and outlier-adjusted version of the dependent variable, but where
the teaching variable for each unique hospital was fixed at the level measured
in the first year of data that the hospital contributed to the analysis. This
specification was considered reasonable in view of the nonsignificant within-
hospital association identified in the fixed effects model. By fixing the teaching
coefficient at its base value we hoped to explore the independent effects
of reduced measurement error in the case-mix index variable, in light of
the fact that the index is based on resource weights and diagnosis grouping
algorithms that have been subject to several incremental improvements over
the study period.
RESULTS
The fixed effects model provides no evidence that changes in teaching inten-
sity within a given hospital are associated with changes in real operating
costs. Estimates of the teaching coefficients for each category of hospital
identified by combinations ofthe interaction terms are plotted in Figure 3. The
standard errors on the estimates are relatively large, suggesting a possibility
that negative study results could be due to insufficient variation in the teaching
intensity variable. The parameter estimates are very close to 0, however, and
within-hospital variation in teaching intensity over the study period is not
insubstantial. (Between PPS years 6 and 12 the unweighted mean resident-
to-bed ratio increased by approximately 3 percent per year, and a variable
computed from each hospital's seven-year change in the value of the ratio
has a mean of .04 with a standard deviation of .082.) Complete fixed effects
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Figure 3: Estimates of Teaching Effects Within Hospitals, over Time
from 7,510 Observations on 1,307 Hospitals, PPS Years 6-12
Coefficients from a Fixed Effects Model with
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Table 2: Results from Longitudinal Model: Estimation on PPS Years
6-12, Using Weighted Fixed Effects Regression
Dependent Variabk is
In(Real Operating Cost per Case) Standard
in 1987 Dollars Coefficient Error P-Value
Teaching intensity:
(reference group is minor teaching, non-DSH)
ln(1+ IRB) .017 .070 .809
Interaction, IRB x DSH -.0011 .0061 .851
Interaction, IRB x major teaching .006 .077 .980
ln(case-mix) .505 .032 <.0000
ln(#beds) .047 .011 <.0000
DSH status -.0011 .0061 .860
Major teaching status (dropped)
Time trends: PPS 7 .0405 .0039 <.0000
PPS 8 .0611 .0040 <.0000
PPS 9 .0454 .0043 <.0000
PPS 10 .0306 .0044 <.0000
PPS 11 -.0190 .0048 <.0000
PPS 12 -.0592 .0051 <.0000
Note: Intercept terms are not reported. R2 value includes the contribution of the 1,307
fixed hospital variables, whose coefficients are not shown.
Number of observations = 7,510; number of hospitals = 1,307. Adjusted R2 = .888;
F(12,6191) = 115.54.
1279
1280 HSR: Health Services Research 35:6 (February 2001)
estimation results are presented in Table 2. Coefficients on the PPS year
indicators confirm what was noted earlier about trends in real case-mix
adjusted costs over this time period. Since the coefficients reflect each year's
cost difference compared to the reference year (PPS 6), annual changes in
cost per case are measured by the increments to the coefficients across each
successive study year.
The cross-sectional models, in contrast, continue to show a significant,
positive correlation between teaching intensity and cost per case when ex-
amined across hospitals. A clear downward trend over time in the strength
of the teaching effect is evident from the coefficients on the time-trend
interaction terms. Results from each of the four specifications designed to
capture cross-sectional association are summarized in Table 3. The coefficient
on the teaching variable in the first specification is 0.573 in the reference
year (PPS 6), but it drops by 45 percent over the study period. Predicted
effects on retransformed cost from this first estimation, by PPS year, can
be seen in Figure 4. [In keeping with Rogowski and Newhouse's (1992)
recommendation, smearing adjustments have been estimated and included
in the computations of predicted cost.4] All time-based interaction terms are
significantly different from 0 and are significantly different from each other,
with the exception of the increment from PPS year 9 to PPS year 10. The
coefficient on the logged case-mix index variable is close to 1.00 in each of
these models, as expected. In all models, urban status has a significant positive
effect of approximately 6 percent on cost per case. The parameter estimates
on the time-trend indicators in all four specifications are expressed in Table
3 as linear combinations of their main and interacted terms. As in the fixed
effects model, these estimates represent comparisons to PPS year 6. Unlike
the fixed effects model, they reflect inflation effects as well as other cost trends
because the dependent variables are measured in current dollars.
In the second cross-sectional specification, disproportionate share status
is a strong teaching effect modifier. Major teaching status, however, is not a
significant covariate or interaction term when included simultaneously with
the DSH variables (a reflection of the large degree of overlap between these
groups). In the third specification, replacing the dependent variable with
one constructed from costs net of DSH and outlier payments reduces the
teaching coefficients by 10 to 15 percent in the reference year, but does not
appear to alter the decline in teaching effects over time. The coefficient on the
indicator variable for DSH status does, however, reverse sign and increase
in magnitude. The negative coefficient is evidence that DSH payments are
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Effects ofMedical Education on Hospital Costs
Figure 4: Declining Strength over Time, in the Cross-Sectional
Association Between Teaching and Operating Costs
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Note: Predicted results include an adjustment to account for retransformation of the error
term, computed across all years. See Appendix for further explanation.
this third specification, no DSH interaction term exists, which leaves major
teaching status to become a significant and strong effect modifier. Linear
combinations of the teaching coefficients with their related interaction terms
(not shown) reveal that by the last year of the study, the coefficient on
ln(1 + IRB) among minor teaching hospitals is reduced to 0.11 and is only
marginally significant (p = .075). The teaching coefficients in the DSH-
adjusted specification decline over the study period by over 70 percent for
minor teaching and 50 percent for major teaching facilities, but the year-to-
year differences are not as evenly spaced as they are in the two unadjusted cost
specifications. Coefficients on the interaction terms for PPS years 6 through
8 do not test significantly differently from each other, nor do those from PPS
years 9 and 10, nor do those from PPS years 11 and 12. Figure 5 plots the
annually estimated teaching elasticities from the DSH-adjusted specification
and permits a comparison with those used in the IME payment formula
in effect during the same period. This graph demonstrates the extent to
which past IME overpayments could have resulted from a combination
of Congress's multiplier factor of 1.89 and the decision not to update the
coefficient over time. The difference in teaching effects between major and
minor teaching hospitals is substantial. Note that the lines plotted for these two
groups are parallel; this is explained by a single major teaching interaction
effect estimated across all years.
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Figure 5: Elasticity Coefficients Between Teaching Intensity and
Operating Costs (Net of Disproportionate Share and Outlier Payments)
by Year and by Type of Teaching Hospital
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The last specification in Table 3 assesses year-to-year changes in the
effect ofteaching on adjusted operating costs after controlling for the effects of
increased teaching intensity over time. When hospital-specific teaching ratios
are fixed, the change in teaching coefficients reflects the impact of secular
changes in other model covariates (including those that are unobserved but
absorbed into the time-trend indicators). The differences between the last
two specifications are moderate; by PPS year 12 the time-trend interaction
term is approximately 12 percent greater in the fixed ratio specification. The
pattern of decline in teaching coefficients over the study period, however,
is very similar. Figure 6 plots the coefficients on the time-based interaction
terms, representing estimates of the annual reduction in indirect medical
education costs for both models. The uneven secular pattern we noticed in the
third cross-sectional estimation, where effect measures tested similarly within
clusters of years, appears to be even stronger when the teaching variable is
fixed in time.
DISCUSSION
Results from these panel data studies support earlier conclusions drawn from
single-year analyses that identify teaching intensity as a proxy for unobserved
hospital and patient characteristics associated with higher costs. Within a
given hospital, however, our results provide no evidence that increases in
Effects ofMedical Education on Hospital Costs
Figure 6: Isolating the Sources of Declining Strength in the
Cross-Sectional Association: Controlling for the Secular Trend Toward
Higher Teaching Intensity
Comparison of Time Trend Interaction Effects
with and without control for increases in




C) 2?-0.3 - q o Measuring IRB at Base Year
* MeasuringIRB atEach Year
-0.4-llllll
PPS6 PPS7 PPS8 PPS9 PPS1O PPSll PPS12
the ratio of residents to beds are associated with increases in unit operating
costs. The absence of a significant longitudinal association between intensity
and costs suggests that the residents themselves are not causal agents in the
teaching cost differentials; thus there is little evidence in these models to
support the resident inefficiency, or "learning curve," explanation for indirect
medical education costs. In models that do not include unique hospital
indicator variables, a distinct pattern of declining teaching effects over time is
evident. The declining cross-sectional effect is consistent with the theory that
observed indirect medical education cost estimates are actually measuring the
effects offixed hospital characteristics, because the decline reflects a "watering
down" effect from the contemporaneous trend ofincreased teaching intensity
within hospitals. However, the increase in teaching ratios over seven years is
not sufficient to explain all or even most of the decline in the cross-hospital
estimates of teaching effects.
The fact that teaching effects decline over time even when the model
fixes the ratios at their earliest level supports the hypothesis that teaching in-
tensity also serves as a proxy for unmeasured patient characteristics (severity,
practice patterns, or both) that are subject to change over time. Discontinuities
in the downward time trend evident in Figures 5 and 6 suggest the possibility
of regulatory or other external influences. Our findings from the estimation
that uses teaching ratios computed from 1989 are consistent with earlier
hypotheses about the role of the case-mix index in the original HCFA model,
particularly its inability to capture systematic differences in within-DRG
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acuity. HCFA has made improvements to the case-mix system each year, but
in the period covered by this study, the most significant changes were made
in 1990-91 (roughly PPS year 8), when it expanded the coding for the most
complex cases (MedPAC 1998). In theory, as the case-mix index improves in
its ability to capture differences in patient acuity, less "unmeasured" severity
remains in the cost equation to be absorbed into the teaching coefficient.
We computed annual correlation coefficients between the IRB and case-mix
index values and found an increase from around 0.37 in PPS years 6 and 7
to 0.41 in PPS year 8, with only very minor increases thereafter. Under PPS
rules, coding and resource weight changes are generally effected in October
of each year. This makes matching their impact in time to cost models that
are dependent on fiscal year-based data difficult, but the drop in estimated
teaching effects between PPS years 8 and 9 suggests a confirmation of the
argument that teaching coefficients reflect unmeasured patient severity.
In both ofour adjusted cost specifications a possibility exists that changes
in theDSH payments could have caused the drops in the teaching effect. DSH
payments show a different growth pattern, however, rising sharply from PPS
years 6 to 7 and increasing steadily but more slowly thereafter. We tested a
variation on the fourth specification, using the unadjusted cost variable. The
results (not shown) are still very similar to those shown in Figure 6.
All of our model results are also consistent with what we know about
structural changes in hospital costs. If decreases in length of stay or other
changes in practice patterns had been consistent across all groups of hospitals,
there would be no reason for such changes to affect the indirect teaching cost
estimates. Because case-mix adjusted cost per case has declined more rapidly
in teaching than in nonteaching settings, that fact should be reflected in the
interaction effects between teaching and the time-trend variables. At least part
of the declining teaching effects can be viewed as a straightforward measure
of a narrowing of the gap between teaching and nonteaching facilities. This
may reflect the impact of market forces, independent of any patterns of
participation in graduate medical education.
POLICY SIGNIFICANCE
How are the findings from these studies relevant to the current policy debate
over appropriate Medicare payments to teaching hospitals? Like the earlier
research on this question, these studies confirm HCFA's initial findings of
a significant, independent teaching cost differential. Although our results
Effects ofMedical Education on Hospital Costs
tend to support original theories that the teaching ratio serves as a proxy
for hospital and patient characteristics, our analysis does not attempt to
address whether the hospital characteristics constitute legitimate grounds for
price differentiation. They may reflect differences in quality or carrying costs
associated with access to technology and biomedical advances; or they may
reflect an historical accumulation of a management culture less attuned to
efficiency or competition.
The findings should, however, provide some insight into appropriate
ways to translate results from cost modeling into an equitable PPS adjustment.
Shortly after the PPS legislation was enacted, Newhouse (1983) predicted
that both the direct and indirect medical education adjustments would in-
crease hospital demand for residents. Although empirical work to date has
not demonstrated a strong relationship between Medicare graduate medical
education payments and residency program expansion (Dalton 1999), results
from our fixed effects model strengthen the argument that IME payments
create additional financial incentives to expand training. Our findings imply
that a payment adjustment derived from the observed cross-sectional asso-
ciation should not be tied to short-term changes in an individual hospital's
teaching intensity. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 partially accomplished
this correction by capping each teaching hospital's IRB ratio at its 1996 levels.
Unfortunately, the law continues to link reductions in the IME adjustments
to reductions in a hospital's teaching activities. Even though the payment
effect of a reduction in training is spread over a three-year period (because
the adjustment is now based on a moving average of the capped ratio), any
within-hospital link creates a potential disincentive for teaching facilities to
downsize their training programs (AAMC 1997a). Our research does not
support the notion that costs per discharge should decline as hospitals make
incremental reductions to their complements of on-site residents.
Second, our study results suggest that changes in observed teaching
effects are related to changes in the case-mix index. This is consistent with
the current thinking of the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission; most
recently, MedPAC informed Congress that it intends to re-estimate teaching
cost differentials using an expanded DRG grouping system to reduce the
influence of unmeasured acuity on the teaching cost estimates (MedPAC
1999). Our results imply that IME formulas should be re-estimated whenever
significant diagnosis grouping changes are made.
Third, our study confirms that the strength of the teaching association is
greater among major teaching programs. Significant interaction terms in our
estimations are consistent with earlier research that identified nonlinearities
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in the effect of teaching on logged cost. An implication of this finding is
that a multilevel adjustment formula by selected hospital groups might be
worth examining. Before such an approach is considered, further investigation
should be conducted to explore the role of research activities in the teaching
cost differentials to determine whether the nonlinearities are a function of
program size or of size plus other academic characteristics. Furthermore, in
light of other secular patterns noted in the declining cost per discharge, trends
in the interaction effects over time should be examined in greater detail.
The presence of a separate disproportionate share adjustment under
PPS complicates the IME model's interpretation and its application to pay-
ment policy. DSH payments are considered to be both "cost" and "policy"
adjustments (ProPAC 1995; Ross 1999). As policy adjustments, they are delib-
erately allowed to overcompensate for differences in the cost ofcare delivered
to Medicare patients in order to ease the financial burden from care delivered
to medically indigent populations and protect the special missions of these
institutions. If the teaching cost model does not control for DSH payments,
IME and DSH adjustments will at least partially duplicate each other. Yet
netting DSH payments from the dependent variable in an IME cost model
would have the effect ofeliminating the policy component from the combined
PPS payments of teaching hospitals. Retaining the DSH indicator variable
in the cost model partially offsets the problem because some portion of the
policy effect can be said to be absorbed into the negative coefficient on the
DSH variable (leaving the teaching coefficients higher than they would be in a
model without the indicator). Sheingold (1990) described another approach
to the problem, using an array of DSH variables with empirically derived
coefficient constraints. Appropriate model specification with respect to dis-
proportionate share payments will depend primarily on the policy intentions
behind the DSH legislation.
Finally, we note that the federal standardized rate per discharge is
computed from a cost base that is statistically adjusted to remove the estimated
indirect costs of medical education. A distortion in the teaching coefficient
therefore affects the payments of both teaching and nonteaching facilities.
Substantive revisions to the IME formulas prior to the Balanced Budget Act
of 1997 were accompanied by adjustments to the standardized rate, resulting
in payment redistributions rather than reductions. Improving the empirical
basis for teaching hospital cost differentials should be viewed as a matter of
appropriate product differentiation and as an issue of distributional equity, if
only to provide a baseline from which budgetary and policy objectives can
be more intelligently considered.
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NOTES
1. These figures, and others noted later, are computed by the authors from infor-
mation contained in the Hospital Cost Report Information System files (HCRIS).
The files are described in more detail in the Data section.
2. The IME formula is derived from the ratio of expected costs among teaching
hospitals to expected costs among nonteaching hospitals, holding all other model
variables constant. If X is the teaching variable and J is its coefficient, and if all
other covariates and their coefficients are represented by Zy and the residuals
by £, the expected cost differential is calculated by exponentiating the estimation
results as follows:
[ ( E(Y)I , )ll [((e(XP)ezYe6)Ia ) - ]
EV(Y)lnneJJ J L (e(Wliezyee£)l
Because we assume other covariates are held constant, the exponentiated Zy
terms in the numerator and denominator cancel out. Similarly, if no groupwise
heteroscedasticity exists that results in systematically different variance according
to teaching status, the exponentiated error terms will also cancel out. Ifthe teaching
variable is set to 0 for all nonteaching hospitals, the denominator will be 1 and the
formula for the cost differential reduces to [eXi - 1]. In the case where X is defined
as the ln(l + IRB), however, the expression becomes [e(ln(l+lRB)) _ 1], which is
equivalent to (1 + IRB)P - 1.
3. HCFA's original specification of the teaching variable has been retained in each of
the models addressed by this article. In other analyses we have measured teaching
effects using a log transformation of (.001 + IRB) similar to that recommended
by Rogowski and Newhouse (1992). The size of the constant added prior to log
transformation can have a substantial influence on the predicted teaching effect
across groups of hospitals (depending on other assumptions made with regard to
the log-linear form), but it does not affect the observed patterns of teaching cost
differentials over time. Choice of functional form in the teaching variable is a
complex issue, which we intend to address in greater detail in a subsequent article.
4. Following Duan (1983) and Manning (1998), the appropriate estimate for the
expected value of an exponentiated, nonnormally distributed error term is the
smearing factor, computed as the mean ofthe exponentiated residuals. Ifgroupwise
heteroscedasticity specific to teaching status is present, smearing factors must
be computed separately for the observations in the numerator and denomina-
tor of the ratio for the teaching cost differential (see Note 2). Letting s repre-
sent the smearing factor, the corrected teaching cost differential is computed as
[(1+ IRB)13x S4- _1.
SI nonkao
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